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HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, by William Patry. Oxford University
Press, 2012. 336 pp. Hardback $21.95.
Reviewed by Michael J. Madison, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
madison@pitt.edu
I have long enjoyed reading William Patry’s scholarship on copyright, not
only because I agree with most of his prescriptions but also, and mostly,
because his writing relies on a substantive modesty and a stylistic
readability that makes his arguments inherently appealing. HOW TO FIX
COPYRIGHT, his latest book (following on MORAL PANICS AND THE
COPYRIGHT WARS) 1 , delivers the goods once again. Patry assesses the
entirety of modern copyright, from its foundations to its details, and finds it
wanting. His prescription is that policymakers should simply start over,
taking modern technologies, markets, and uses as their starting points rather
than continuing to build atop the legacy of 18th century bookselling and
historical practices of producing cultural commodities.
For the veteran observer of copyright debates, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT
breaks little new ground but reviews a broad range of issues in an accessible
and common sense way. For a reader who is less familiar with the details
of what some (like Patry) refer to as “the copyright wars,” HOW TO FIX
COPYRIGHT is a helpful overview of the relevant landscape, accompanied
by some gentle and some sharp proposals for reform. Regardless of
background, one would be hard-pressed to find a better contemporary
synthesis of what ails copyright today. Given the breadth of Patry’s
experience in copyright―as a staff member in the House of
Representatives, as a scholar, and now as copyright counselor to
Google―that comes as no surprise.
What is something of a surprise, coming from someone with Patry’s
reputation as a careful, ground-it-in-logic-not-ideology student of the
discipline, is the strength of his current convictions. Copyright is not just
broken but is broken very badly, in his judgment, and it is failing the very
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people―authors and readers―that it was originally intended, according to
the mythos of the law, to serve.
That said, I have a few quibbles with the book and one larger bone to pick.
But first, a summary.
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT might have been better titled “What About
Copyright Needs to be Fixed?”, because rather more of the book is given
over to what is wrong with today’s copyright and rather less of it is devoted
to prescriptions and solutions. But that would have deprived the author of
the pun-ish title, and of the following deeper point. Technology and society
are fast-moving substrates for any law that deals in creativity and culture.
The challenge in “fixing” copyright is not merely to lay claim to the law’s
concern with original works of authorship that are “fixed” in a tangible
medium of expression, but also to identify the point where the law itself, as
a stable institution, can safely and justly engage with the dynamic people
and institutions that it touches.
What about copyright needs to be fixed, at least in that first sense? The
answer, in a nutshell, is almost everything. In Patry’s telling, today’s
copyright law and legislation is dominated by greedy, rent-seeking
corporate copyright interests that invoke property rhetoric excessively and
deprive the public―both first-generation and second-comer authors,
readers, viewers, listeners, and users―of the full benefits available under a
dynamic intellectual property regime. Historical copyright has been undone
by modern changes to technology and markets. Restoring a healthy
alignment between law and society means giving fuller weight in
lawmaking to demand-based and consumer-based priorities. The question
for copyright law is not “what do authors deserve?” so much as it is “what
do consumers want?” And doing that effectively and fairly means restoring
lawmaking processes that are based on the empirics of creativity,
innovation, and commercialization, rather than on ideology and rhetoric.
The full argument can be summarized, then, in a handful of quotations:


Laws must be consistent with prevailing markets and
technologies because technologies play a large (though not
exclusive) role in creating consumer demand; markets then
satisfy that demand. Without consumer demand for your
book or musical work, owning a copyright is meaningless.
(p.2)
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I call for a moratorium on the introduction and passage of
any new legislation until (1) we have established
independent,
rigorous,
economically
verifiable
methodologies by which all proposals will be tested and later
reviewed for their effectiveness, and (2) we have tested all
existing laws by those methodologies and have repealed or
suitably amended those that fail the review. (pp.5-6)



My view is that copyright laws can serve valuable purposes:
while they do not cause people to create in the first place and
do not create economic or critical success, they do ensure
that once works are created, those who wish to protect them
and economically benefit can. (p.11)

There is much more to the book, of course, but through Patry’s entire text –
covering copyright fundamentals (the concept of the copy should be
revisited); copyright-based business models (current copyright serves the
large-scale “winner take all” models of commercial creativity, not authors
and other creators themselves); licensing and clearance complexities (Patry
bemoans the absence of a worldwide system for simplifying clearance of
rights in musical works); copyright enforcement (overbroad and punitive
remedies foster disrespect for the law and undermine its legitimacy); and
some specifics of doctrine (the unnecessary extension of property interests
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; the overly-long length of the
copyright term; the virtues of some copyright formalities; and a reprise of
Patry’s “moral panic” argument about the proper uses of fair use)―a
handful of common themes repeat: Copyright should be sensitive to market
and technological context. Markets and technological contexts keep
changing. Changing the law (or failing to change the law) without carefully
considering the impact of the law runs the risk of disabling actual human
beings, on a wide scale, from making beneficial use of―even profiting
from―creative work. At almost every step, Patry illustrates his claims with
data―not only data from today’s creative economy, but historical accounts.
Unlike much cultural criticism of the excesses of contemporary copyright,
this criticism is situated in the full range of modern copyright history rather
than only in an account of the last 20 years. The virtue of the book lies
more in the synthesis of these things in a single, breezy volume and less in
their specifics.
Veteran observers (including me) will recognize many of the critiques and
proposals from academic and other policy criticism of the last decade. At
the margins, the book may be faulted for focusing too much on conflicts
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between business interests and individual interests as expressed (on both
sides) in legal terms, and not enough on other fora and frameworks:
government institutions, both in the US and especially outside the US, that
are devoted to cultural flourishing; and systems of informal interests
collected as social norms, histories, formal institutions and informal
practices that play important roles in both the production and distribution of
creative works. The book takes a modestly critical attitude with respect to
the foundational concept of the copy in copyright but does not dive more
deeply into the phenomenal basis for the law. Why, it might be said, must
copyright attach itself to the work of authorship? If Patry is really serious
about stripping copyright to its core and building from first principles,
taking evidence as a guide, then let’s really start at the beginning. What do
creators create, and what do consumers consume? Readers read? Viewers
watch? And so on. But Patry is a pragmatist, not a theoretician. He
engages where the argument is already well underway, and wisely, he does
so where he thinks he can have impact.
Those are my quibbles. It almost goes without saying that a reviewer
situated differently, say, grounded in Lockean philosophy or Coasean
economics, or attached concretely to the benefits thought to be associated
with existing cultural institutions (commercial publishers, film producers,
record labels, and the like) might quibble differently and more aggressively.
Patry’s “readers first” approach conflicts directly with the “authors first”
philosophy and economy that informs the other side of the copyright
debates that he identifies.
But I promised a bit more. I have a bigger concern.
Patry makes no bones about his distaste for “corporate” creativity and for
the arcane business architectures of the contemporary copyright community.
He writes:
Our copyright laws are, and have always been, a winnertake-all system. If that is the desired policy, then our
copyright laws are working fine. If, however, the policy is to
create diverse works by diverse members of our society in
order to create a rich cultural heritage, then it is important to
realize copyright laws have never accomplished that
purpose. Indeed, our copyright laws on steroids are
impeding creativity. (p.80)
Yet HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT offers “the market” as the ultimate arbiter
of consumer (reader) interests in copyright. Patry again:
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Many businesses that rely on copyrighted material have a
problem: not enough consumers are paying for their works.
While copyright owners like to portray this as a legal
problem―a problem of piracy―the problem is a market
problem, arising from the continuing failure of copyright
owners to respond and adapt to changing markets and the
technologies that drive consumer demand. (p.141)
Note the framing here. Markets drive demand. Technologies drive
markets. As technologies change, markets change, and demand changes.
Copyright owners need to adapt and respond to demand. Here and
elsewhere, Patry builds on the work done in the UK via a report.,
commissioned by the British Government and published in the United
Kingdom in 2011. 2
Patry does not pause to consider the possibility that the abstraction he calls
“markets” might plausibly and logically lead to the winner-take-all results
that he decries. Markets today might be working just fine; consumers might
simply prefer to spend their time and money on Hollywood blockbusters
and sound-alike pop songs. Or markets might not work well at all;
consumers might prefer documentaries and independent films and quirky
folk/bluegrass blends. Patry’s money seems to be on the latter, but how
might we ever know what consumers―who on the latter account really
ought to be called readers, listeners, and viewers, as a well as authors in
their own rights―really want?
As I wandered through Patry’s argument, I recalled the work of another
veteran copyright observer who commented, perhaps more optimistically,
on how copyright and copyright owners should respond to changes in
technology.
In 1994, Paul Goldstein published COPYRIGHT’S
HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 3 a prescient book that
considered the copyright system in comprehensive terms, bearing in mind
history and emerging changes in technology. Goldstein came to the
judgment―like Patry―that copyright and copyright owners needed to be
attuned to the new landscape. And the best way to do that was to let the
market mediate consumer demand. This was the only way, Goldstein
concluded, and the best way, to figure out what was and is best for society:
The digital future is the next, and perhaps ultimate, phase in
copyright’s long trajectory, perfecting the law’s early aim of
connecting authors to their audiences, free from interference
by political sovereigns or the will of patrons. The main
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challenge will be to keep this trajectory clear of the buffets
of protectionism and true to copyright’s historic logic that
the best prescription for connecting authors to their
audiences is to extend rights into every corner where
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works. If
history is any measure, the result should be to promote
political as well as cultural diversity, ensuring a plenitude of
voices, all with the chance to be heard. 4
Goldstein came across as an optimist about copyright’s future; Patry comes
across as a pessimist. Yet they each look to technology and to markets for
sources and solutions. How can Patry and Goldstein come to such different
judgments? Can they both be right?
One answer is that they are both wrong. “The market” is a monist
metaphor, and a kind of black box, that conceals the plural ways in which
creative work is created and enjoyed, and the ways in which many
individuals are precluded from participating in “markets” as they wish to.
Julie Cohen dives deeply into just this critique in her recent book,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE. 5
As a second answer, and the one that I prefer, I am inclined to give Patry
(and Goldstein, too) the benefit of the doubt. I think that when William
Patry argues that copyright lawmakers should listen to the market, the
metaphor he invokes is not the metaphor that Paul Goldstein invoked―even
though the phrase itself is, of course, identical.
Goldstein was laying out the Coasean argument for the design of
transaction-centered copyright economics. If we take seriously copyright’s
prescription of aesthetic nondiscrimination and extend the judicial humility
at its core by one more step―to a position of full epistemic humility―then
there is no reason to suppose that policymakers know the shape of society’s
cultural welfare curve better than consumers themselves do. The only
practical and possibly objective way to measure welfare under that curve is
by price―that is, by consumer’s willingness to pay. Market transactions
measure utility; thus the aim of copyright policy should be to maximize the
number and value of market transactions. If Britney Spears becomes rich
and famous in part because copyright protects her record label’s prices, then
who are we to complain that Lucinda Williams has not gotten the hearing
she deserves in the cultural marketplace?
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Patry’s market, while far from fully detailed, is a different thing, with a
different aim. Patry’s market, it seems to me, is not only or even primarily
the market that results from made transactions in cultural works; it is not the
market that follows, as Goldstein’s does, from the specification of legal
rights in copyright. Instead, Patry’s market is the set of consumer (reader,
etc.) choices that are made available and specified prior to policy decisions
regarding the design of exclusive rights. Goldstein’s transacting authors
and consumers are free to choose rationally from the goods and services
they produce and encounter; Patry’s authors and consumers are differently
enabled and disabled from choosing, based on the phenomena of digital
networked technology. As a starting point, but not as an end point, in
Patry’s market creative works exist in their ideal sense in endlessly
replicable digital abundance, rather than only in depletable analog copies.
In that market specified by digital abundance, does copyright need to be
fixed? In the casual “does it need to be repaired?” sense, William Patry is
clearly correct: It does, and he makes a persuasive case regarding the
reasons. In the more subtle “can copyright be made effective as a static
body of law?” sense, I am not sold, much as I liked this book. The
technological specifications of Patry’s market are changing day by day, and
perhaps too swiftly for any body of law fully, and adequately, to deal with
them. But may answering that challenge fully be part of Patry’s next
offering.
ENDNOTES
1

William Patry, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS
(Oxford University Press, 2009)

2

Ian Hargreaves, “Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property
and Growth”, (2011) available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreviewfinalreport.pdf
3

Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE
OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX (Hill and Wang, 1994)
4

Id. at p.236

5

Julie E. Cohen, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW,
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (Yale University
Press, 2012)
Suggested Citation: 3 The IP Law Book Review: 29 (2013)
© 2013 Michael J. Madison

The IP Law Book Review

35

Vol. 3 No. 2 (April 2013) pp. 36-42
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, by William Patry. Oxford University
Press, 2012. 336 pp. Hardback $21.95.
Reviewed by Alfred C. Yen, Boston College Law School.
alfred.yen@bc.edu
In HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, William Patry offers his thoughts about
the problems that beset copyright. Patry, like many others 1 believes that
copyright does not serve its stated purpose of incentivizing the creation and
dissemination of new creative works. 2 Instead, copyright enriches those
who own copyright rights while inhibiting creativity and restricting access
to creative works. Patry lays blame for this on a number of corporatesponsored fallacies about copyright that support overly broad copyright
rights. He uses this book to discuss these fallacies, how they affect the
present shape of copyright, and his ideas for improving copyright.
Patry is one of America’s most accomplished copyright lawyers and the
author of an important treatise. 3 Accordingly, any book written by Patry is
presumptively worth attention as an opportunity to learn from his vast
experience in the field. Not surprisingly, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT
showcases Patry’s knowledge. He easily moves through basic copyright,
multiple industries, technology, history, and international problems. The
result is an engaging, accessible description of what ails copyright and how
Patry thinks it might be fixed.
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT describes two separate, but related, problems.
First, Patry claims that modern copyright is far stronger than necessary to
serve the public interest. Second, Patry lays the blame for this on
corporations and executives who profit by acquiring and exploiting huge
numbers of copyrighted works in one-sided deals that generally siphon
revenue away from creative authors. These wealthy actors understand that
their profits depend on the value of the copyrights they hold, so they and
their legislative allies have concocted a myth to justify the progressive
strengthening of copyright (p.13). This myth holds that copyright “causes
amazing things to happen for the benefit of everyone, and with no conflicts
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or tradeoffs” (p.13). Unfortunately, “villains” like file sharers and Internet
companies threaten to disrupt the quasi-utopia supported by copyright, so
society needs stronger copyright rights to fight these villains (pp.13-14).
Patry spends a good deal of the book attacking this myth. He observes that
copyright doesn’t make a person creative (pp.15-16). Copyright may create
economic opportunities for copyright holders by stopping others from free
riding, but creative talent and initiative – not copyright – make a work
successful in the first place (p.16). Indeed, Patry contends, the economic
opportunities created by copyright actually encourage the corporations who
hold most valuable copyrights to shy away from creative efforts in favor of
bland works that recycle popular themes in banal ways (pp.20-26). Patry
suggests, with some justification, that true support for creativity and culture
might better come from more direct subsidies such as government grants,
tax breaks, and the development of infrastructure that supports authors
trying to reach audiences (pp.17, 26-29).
Next, Patry attacks the claim that copyright boosts economic productivity
and competitiveness (pp.32-33). Patry argues that copyright does no such
thing. As evidence, he cites the European Union’s database directive,
which strengthened protection for databases (pp.33-34, 71-74). Although
the directive was passed to strengthen the European database industry,
American database manufacturers outperform their European counterparts
without the benefit of specific database protection. 4 Patry goes on to argue
that copyright does not improve competitiveness. Indeed, he claims it
harms competition because copyright gets concentrated in the hands of
large corporate actors who push for stronger copyright protection as a way
to prevent competition (pp.34-35).
Finally, Patry attacks the assertion that copyright is necessary for the
flourishing of copyright-based business. Here, Patry notes that traditional
copyright-based industries have generally adopted business models that
exploit copyright-supported artificial scarcity. He notes, however, that the
world has fundamentally changed because digital technology enables the
reproduction and distribution of works at no cost (pp.35-41). Such a world
is fundamentally incompatible with business models based on scarcity
because artificial scarcity will become impossible to maintain. Copyright
therefore encourages copyright-based industries to cling stubbornly to old
business models (such as selling compact discs full of music) that are
doomed to fail as consumers migrate to digital forms of distribution. Patry
argues that copyright-based businesses would benefit from recognizing the
impact of digital technology and adopting business models that exploit,
instead of resist, the benefits digital technology will bring (pp.42-47).
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Having debunked the myth responsible for the present shape of copyright,
Patry argues that society should replace blind faith in myth with a rational
approach to copyright based on “empirically sound evidence” (p.90).
According to Patry, this approach to copyright should lead courts and
Congress to weaken copyright significantly because copying, not
copyright’s restriction of copying, promotes creativity. “If we genuinely
want to encourage creativity, we must encourage copying” (p.90). And
indeed, over the next few chapters Patry offers a number of general
proposals for how this might be done. These include shortening the
duration of copyright (pp.189-201), imposing formalities to maintain
copyrights (pp.203-209) taking a more generous approach towards fair use
(pp.211-229), and more effective use of payment methods like compulsory
licensing, levies on recording materials, and collective licensing (pp.177188).
On the whole, I agree with Patry’s assertion that copyright is much stronger
than it needs to be for society’s overall benefit. Recent extension of
copyright’s duration surely does little to encourage new creation, 5 courts
have adopted readings of fair use that interfere with the creation of new
works, 6 and enactments like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act make it
very easy for copyright holders to run roughshod over the rights of noninfringers who are not familiar with its complicated procedures and
substantive copyright law. 7 Society would probably be well served by
adopting many of Patry’s recommendations.
I also agree that large corporate actors have played a significant role in
promoting stronger copyright through rhetoric that incorporates the myth
Patry identifies. However, I am unsure if corporate ownership of copyright
is as troubling as Patry claims. Moreover, even if one concludes that
concentrated ownership of copyright is undesirable, I do not think that
Patry’s suggested reforms will bring about the necessary change because
social forces beyond copyright are probably responsible for the
concentrated control he criticizes.
Patry objects to heavy corporate ownership of copyrights because he
considers it a form of trickle-down economics that enriches corporations
and their executives while keeping money from creative individuals to
whom money should flow. Patry gives us statistics to show that four record
labels control about 85% of the U.S. market for recorded music and that 5
motion picture studios control 80% of the U.S. motion picture market
(pp.111-112). He also notes that in 2010, Viacom’s CEO made $84.5
million, and that top executives at Warner Brothers made $83.9 million
while the company was losing money (pp.112-113). For Patry, this
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concentration of wealth presents a “crisis in copyright policy” (p.113)
because trickle-down economics does not work. Passing copyright laws
that enrich corporations and corporate executives is the same thing as
cutting taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals. It isn’t wise policy
for the general economy, so it can’t possibly be good copyright policy either
(pp.109-113).
For those who share Patry’s general skepticism about trickle-down
economics, this argument may be persuasive. However, there are plenty of
reputable economists (not to mention members of the public) who have
confidence in the general notion that helping the wealthy and large
corporations inures to the benefit of society at large because their spending
and investment create opportunities for others. 8 It is easy to imagine how
these economists would conclude that Patry does not have “empirically
sound evidence” to back up his claims about copyright. Indeed, they might
dismiss Patry’s argument as ideological rhetoric of the sort used to unfairly
impugn conservative economic policies. They might well argue that
corporate ownership of copyright exists because it is the most economically
efficient way to market and distribute works to the general public. After all,
most authors do not have access to printing presses, marketing experts, and
distribution networks. Corporations provide these essential facilities and
services at a fee that reflects bargains freely made.
Even if one accepts Patry’s argument against the concentrated business
ownership of copyright rights, it is not clear that his proffered solutions
would decrease concentrated ownership or funnel revenue towards creative
authors. Consider what would happen if Congress significantly reduced the
duration of copyright. This would obviously reduce the power of
corporately held copyright by more quickly dedicating works to free public
use. It would not, however, decrease the corporate ownership of works still
protected by copyright. The economic forces that cause authors to sign
rights away to corporations will not disappear simply because Congress
shortened copyright’s duration. Authors who believe it is in their best
interests to sign book contracts with corporate publishers will still do so.
Corporations will therefore still reap the lion’s share of copyright benefits,
but for a shorter period of time.
A similar conclusion applies if, as Patry suggests, Congress required
copyright holders to comply with new formalities as a condition of getting
or maintaining copyright.
Perhaps copyrights would expire unless
copyright holders formally renewed them every 25 years, or perhaps failure
to place notice on a copyrighted work would preclude the copyright holder
from enforcing its rights. While such measures would probably result in
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some (mostly unprofitable) works reaching the public domain quickly, it’s
not likely that corporations will abandon profitable works very often. True,
Congress could increase the abandonment rate by making it more costly and
complicated to comply with formalities, but this could have the unintended
effect of causing individual authors, and not corporations, to lose copyrights
– a result the public might find unattractive.
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT is an enjoyable book written by an astute
observer of its subject. However, it only partially addresses the problems
that it identifies. Our copyright law is too strong, and Patry gives us some
sensible ways to improve (if not completely fix) that problem. Our
copyright law also makes it possible for corporations who own copyrights
to earn significant profits at the expense of creative authors, and it
incentivizes those corporations to push for copyright laws that don’t serve
the public interest. Unfortunately, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT does not
tell us how to fix that problem, and perhaps it cannot.
Copyright works by giving authors the chance to profit from exploiting their
works. Because authors are not experts in marketing and distributing their
works, they generally must deal with commercial distributors to realize
copyright’s economic promises. Those businesses bargain hard to take
what Patry thinks are an inappropriate percentage of the profits that are
ultimately raised.
This is a poignant observation that raises an
understandable impulse to better compensate those who engage in the
authorial labors that society admires.
Additional reflection suggests, however, that a real solution to this would
have been impossible for Patry. The world is full of individuals like
teachers and firefighters who arguably don’t get paid what they deserve, and
there are plenty of individuals and entities who probably make more than
they “should”. Society may be tempted to “fix” this problem through law,
but it generally refrains from doing so because it would be unwise to try to
figure out exactly what every deserving or undeserving person should really
make. If this is true, then HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT demonstrates how
copyright simply reflects tensions that run throughout our society. Once
economic rights are created, markets will emerge to allocate those rights,
and society may not always be pleased with the result. Whether and how to
“fix” those problems is one of the most vexing questions our society
confronts today. If we ever figure out the answer to that question, perhaps
then we will be ready to truly “fix” copyright.
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Chicago Economics on Trial, Wall Street Journal Online (Sept. 24, 2011),
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904194604576583382550
849232.html (noting advice by Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas to cut taxes on
capital to stimulate growth in investment, productivity, and income) (visited
December 11, 2012); Edward C. Prescott, So Why Do Americans Work So
Much More Than Europeans?, 28 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review 2 (2004) (finding that marginal tax rates affect the labor
supply in the United States and Europe).
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Vol. 3 No. 2 (April 2013) pp. 43-50
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT, by William Patry. Oxford University
Press, 2012. 336 pp. Hardback $21.95.
Author’s Response by William Patry, Google, Inc.
williampatry@yahoo.com
Thanks to Professor Gallagher for the idea of this discussion, and for
making it happen. Thanks, of course, to Mike Madison and Fred Yen for
taking the time to read my book and write up a review. Theirs is, in some
ways, a thankless task: if a reviewer is effusive in his or her praise, the
author will be pleased, but you run the risk of alienating readers of your
review who may dismiss it as puffery. On the other hand, if you are quite
critical of the book, you can be sure the author will be upset, while readers
of the review are likely to be divided by their own preconceptions of the
author and the reviewer. Reviewing a book is tough work.
Reading reviews of your book is also tough. I have come to dread reviews
of books I write. I dread reviews because they are rarely about the book,
but are too often a mere platform for the reviewer to show how much
smarter, how much more knowledgeable he or she allegedly is than the
author of the book. This thinly disguised form of self-promotion usually
takes the form of a lengthy discourse on what the reviewer would have
written, or the reviewer’s perspective on the subject. The author of the
book being reviewed always falls short, and so even if there is praise, it is
faint and misplaced. I had one such recent reviewer tell me I should be
pleased that the review was being placed in such a prestigious law review. I
wasn’t pleased, since I was simply the foil to illuminate the reviewer’s selfperceived brilliance.
Other reviewers have a baffling hatred for my employer, and falsely treat
HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT as corporate propaganda. As I note in the
foreword, I could never get any of my colleagues to look at drafts of the
book. A well-oiled propaganda machine should at least have some role in
generating its own propaganda, but despite writing two books since joining
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Google, I have not managed to ever get a Google employee to look at a
draft single page of either book, despite many, many efforts. Moreover, I
have been writing books on copyright since 1985, when my fair use treatise
was first published. I didn’t join Google until October 2006, 21 years later.
Among other works I have written since the fair use treatise, is a 7,000-page
treatise, all before I joined Google, creating a pretty big record to have to
swallow if I had decided to become a corporate shill. Those who regard my
books as corporate propaganda have never delved into such fine points, or
sought to even examine my much larger opus. As my mother used to say to
me when losing an argument, “Don’t confuse me with the facts.”
What I hope for in a book review―whether of my book or of someone
else’s—is an effort to understand what the author sought to accomplish, and
then an analysis of how well the author did so. By this standard, Mike’s
and Fred’s are exemplary reviews. I am grateful to them. They set out to
dissect what they think I was saying, and then describe their areas of
agreement or disagreement. Since language is imprecise, there can be
differences of opinion about an author’s intent, purpose, and meaning.
This response is intended to clear up a few aspects of the reviews where my
intentions, purposes, and text diverge from Mike and Fred’s assessments.
The bottom line is this: I think the areas of disagreement are attributable
not to different views, but to misunderstandings. I leave it to others to
decide whether those misunderstandings are the result of things I said in the
text, or to Mike and Fred’s interpretation of my text. After all, as authors of
their reviews, Mike and Fred are now subject to the same interpretative
problems with their reviews as I have with my book.
Background
Even though I am a child of the 1960s and grew up across the Golden Gate
Bridge in Marin County, I am not a radical or an ideologue. Indeed, my
experiences during that wonderful era have made me skeptical of radicals
and ideologues. I was very pleased that Mike said I have a reputation as “a
careful, ground-it-in-logic-not ideology student of the discipline.” The
older I get, the more it seems to me that radicals and ideologues (and many
are both) ignore the complexities of life, overlook the ambiguity of
experiences, confuse correlation with causation, and forget that most of us
just want to enjoy life, our family, and our friends. We are not out to
remake the world so much as to find our place in it. We are pragmatic, and
not theoreticians. I have no interest in ideology or theory, both of which
remind me of the criticism of a current French politician about the U.S.
economy: “Yes, it works in practice, but how does it work in theory?”
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Yippie founder and political activist Abbe Hoffman (author of the
appropriately named work “Steal This Book”) found out that ideologues are
generally held in low regard, especially by people just trying to enjoy
themselves. Appearing at Woodstock in 1969, he rushed the stage during a
performance by The Who. He was protesting the jailing of White Panther
John Sinclair, but was chased off the stage by Peter Townsend, who is
reported to have hit him (accidentally or not), on the back with his guitar,
causing Hoffman to topple off the stage and into the pit. His fall was
cheered by concert-goers.
We all want to improve things, to make our lives and those of our family
and friends better, but we don’t want to destroy things in the process. John
Lennon made this point the year before Woodstock, in his lyrics for the
song “Revolution”:
You say you want a revolution
Well, you know
We all want to change the world
You tell me that it’s evolution
Well, you know
We all want to change the world
But when you talk about destruction
Don’t you know that you can count me out.
That’s my view of copyright law too. I look at copyright law as a
traditionalist, as someone who has practiced it for 30 years; as someone
who spent 12 years in private practice representing copyright owners; and
spent 7 years on Capitol Hill with the Copyright Office (hardly an anticopyright institution) and the House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary (ditto). I feel blessed to have spent my professional career in such
a wonderful field of law. My disappointments with the current state of law,
while real, are within-the-family disappointments, much like the
disappointment with a favorite uncle who has a mid-life crisis and does
really stupid things. You still love him, but you want him to get grounded
again. That’s my wish for copyright law: to be grounded in evidence and
crafted so that it can effective accomplish realistic goals. That’s why the
book is called HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT and not “Why We Need to
Abolish Copyright.” 1
Mike is accurate in saying that I believe our current system is badly broken
and that it is failing authors and readers. At the same time, Mike overstates
my views when he says that I believe almost everything needs to be fixed in
our current copyright laws. Many parts, especially the core principles of
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judge-made law (e.g., who is an author, what is an original work, what is
infringement, fair use) are working fine and have for over two hundred
years. The problems―and they are big ones—are both relatively recent and
political: (1) the misuse of copyright law to solve business problems; (2)
the misuse of copyright law to thwart innovation; (3) the misuse of
copyright law as a tool of international trade policy by a few, large
countries; and (4) the over-promising of copyright as the essential element
in competition and cultural policymaking. Since laws are tools and not ends
in themselves, the problems as I see them stem not from any inherent nature
of copyright law, but rather from law’s misuse.
Things weren’t always this way. The 1909 Copyright Act, while having
some problems like all human efforts, was a perfectly fine copyright act.
While I would be happier if we started from scratch in light of a changed
digital environment, or happy if we at least thought things through from
scratch, I would also be happy if we repealed our current laws and simply
went back to the 1909 Copyright Act. Why? Unlike the 1976 Act, the 1909
Act was not ideological. It was pragmatic: how do we protect authors’
(including corporate authors’) investment and get more works to market?
The use of a copyright notice, a renewal requirement, and a generous but
not overly long term of protection, took care of most of our current
difficulties. There were no analog much less digital locks. Copyright was
not being misused as a way to control the features on consumer products
(although that quickly changed after passage of the 1976 Act as reflected in
the Sony Betamax case). Fair use lived purely as a common law creature.
The sum of the 1909 Act was that the term of protection closely
approximated commercial needs, fair use enabled subsequent authors to
build on the works of their predecessors, and there were no orphan works.
I regard the 1909 Act as effective. I don’t regard it, and no one at the time
regarded it, as weak. It was based on empirically sound evidence of how
long copyright needed to be (based on renewal records). Fred asserts I
believe, as he puts it, that “a rational approach to copyright based on
empirically sound evidence … should lead courts and Congress to weaken
copyright significantly … .” This is not an accurate description of my
views. I do not believe that an evidence-based approach to copyright would
weaken copyright protection. “Weaken” is used metaphorically here by
Fred, and I think inappropriately so. We think of weak as bad and strong as
good, so weakening copyright protection is certainly bad. The one thing I
do think of as bad is ineffective laws. Laws are ineffective when they are
not fit for their purpose.
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What is the purpose of copyright laws? Here is where the ideologues seize
an opening to push aside an evidence-based approach. If the purpose of
copyright law is to “secure” property rights, then the sky is the limit to its
strength in a Blackstonian world. If the purpose is, as our current Register
of Copyright has argued, “for authors first and the Nation second,” then fair
use and other principles that help subsequent authors and the public must be
narrowly construed if not vigorously fought. If your purpose is to
encourage the creation of new works, we need to figure out why people
create, the different types of creativity that exist, and what type of
incentives we need. I spend a great deal of time in the book on these
questions, a discussion that is not discussed in the reviews. See Chapters 1
through 3. It is important to figure this out, if as is routinely claimed,
copyright laws are necessary to further creativity. Copyright laws, in my
opinion, suffer from over-promising. They are said to do many things they
can’t, and for those things they can do, we don’t spend the time to make
sure they do them well. This is a criticism of the process, not of any
inherent feature of copyright.
Fred notes my belief that our current copyright laws are far stronger than
are necessary to serve the public interest (I am careful to note that in my
view the public interest includes authors), but he then adds that I blame
“companies and executives who profit by acquiring and exploiting large
numbers of copyrighted works in one-sided deals that generally siphon
revenue away from creative authors.” He later comments that I object to
“heavy corporate ownership of copyrights because [I] consider[] it a form of
trickle-down economics that enriches corporations and their executives
while keeping money from creative individuals to whom the money should
flow.” This does indeed make me sound like a 1960s Marin County radical.
But I’m not. My alleged anti-corporate bias is particularly ironic given that
I work in-house for one of our leading corporations (Google). I believe that
Google collectively and its employees individually are quite creative. The
same can be said for many other corporations, including those in the motion
picture industry. Corporations are not my Moby Dick or even my foil. (I
don’t believe they are “people” within the meaning of the First Amendment
though).
Inequality in bargaining leverage between creators and distributors/patrons
has been an economic fact of life for centuries. Joseph Haydn was a servant
and didn’t own rights in works he created for his patron, as was true for all
other composers of the time. In England, passage of the Statute of Anne
didn’t improve the lot of authors over the prior Stationers Guild regime,
even as authors were put forth Cyrano de Bergerac-like as the reason for the
statute. I am hardly the first to note this. In 1774, Edmund Thurlow, then
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Attorney General of England, argued before the House of Lords that
booksellers had introduced authors into the copyright equation “to give a
colourable Face to their Monopoly.” I detail other comments on pages 107108.
I fully recognize this inequality is not the result of copyright laws, but of the
market place. The problem for copyright policy is that authors are put
forward as the prime beneficiary or at least a principal of the system. (If
you are the Register of Copyright, authors are prime.) They’re not in
practice though. How can a law be effective under such circumstances?
We could be honest and say our copyright laws have always been designed
to benefit those who trade in copyrighted works. If we did that, then our
copyright laws are effective for that purpose. But we are given the false
trickle-down argument: if we give authors the ability to make others rich
off their works, some of the money will trickle back down to authors. Fred
objects to this argument, both for copyright law and for the economy
generally. But his objection equates ideological fervor with facts. I don’t
care about ideology, only facts. Our nation has a greatly diminished middle
class, a growing poor class, and a huge concentration of wealth by the top
0.01 percent of families. This isn’t ideology, it’s a fact, as I set out on
pages 107-113.
It is also a fact of our copyright distribution system, as fewer and fewer
companies own more and more. Contrary to Fred’s assertion, I don’t object
to corporate ownership of copyrights. What I object to is the claim that
increasing the term of copyright and increasing penalties, along with digital
locks, benefits everyone. It doesn’t. It benefits the few at the expense of
the many. I am fine with companies being successful. I want media
companies to be successful. I am a big consumer of their products. I don’t
mind them buying copyrights from authors cheap and selling them dear.
But let’s be clear about whom our laws will benefit. They have never
benefitted primarily individuals. If we want our copyright laws to benefit
individuals then we need to make a number of important revisions, many of
which I detail in the book.
Mike also misapprehends the role I believe copyright law should play. He
states my view as asking not “what do authors deserve?” but rather “what
do consumers want?” Mike believes I want lawmakers to give “fuller
weight” to “demand-based and consumer-based priorities.” I don’t. I want
copyright laws to stay out of the way, to not thwart consumer demand.
What do consumers want is not a question copyright laws should try to
answer. That’s a business, not a legal answer. It becomes a legal problem
only when laws are enacted that give copyright owners the ability to thwart
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consumer demand, e.g., for unlocked phones, for making back-up copies, or
for geo-neutral access. The two most important points I tried to make in the
book are (1) law is not a solution for business problems, (2) many of
copyright owners’ currents problems are business problems, not legal
problems. They should, therefore, solve them as business people. See
chapter 5. The transformation of copyright law from regulating what
people do with copyright works into a tool for allowing copyright owners to
control consumer product/services features, as well as access to works, is
profound and profoundly troubling.
What should be the relationship between markets and copyright laws?
Mike first notes my description of copyright laws as having always
functioned in support of a winner-takes-all system, but adds that I have
(allegedly) not considered “the possibility that the abstraction he calls
‘markets’ might plausibly and logically lead to the winner-takes-all results
that he decries.” I not only accept that possibility, but I declare it: “the
marketplace is fine for works by corporations and by the authors they
support―but it does mean we need to find non-market ways for other
authors and artists to obtain the necessary initial conditions to create”
(p.17). The problem I write about is that copyright laws are claimed to be
able to overcome market forces and to create diverse offerings by such
works. Governments have been very vocal in supporting copyright-onsteroids as cost-free a way to increase cultural offerings, when this is
impossible. If, as a matter of cultural policy, we want more bluegrass,
klezmer and the like, then neither relying on the market or copyright laws is
going to do it; we need other forms of support. That’s my point.
I am therefore grateful that Mike accurately characterizes my view of
markets as “the set of consumer (reader, etc.) choices that are made
available and specified prior to policy decisions regarding the design of
exclusive rights.” I go further and argue that copyright by itself does not
create value. Only the market creates value. Laws can protect that value,
but they can’t create it. The problem in calls for stronger and stronger
copyright laws is that they are often based on the argument that doing so
will create more value. I don’t see how this is true: If you have a movie
that no one wants to see, the strength of your copyright is irrelevant. And if
the world wants to see Justin Bieber and not a klezmer clarinetist, that is the
market at work. But please don’t give Justin Bieber (or more accurately
whatever company owns his rights) a huge grant of rights because it is
either (a) necessary to create value or (b) will help klezmer musicians.
A final point. My call for effective laws is not a call for effective static
laws. See, for example, pages 233-237 (“Innovation Requires a Dynamic
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Legal System”). I argue that markets and the technologies that drive
demand in them are dynamic and that the laws regulating them must be
dynamic too. That will require creativity too.
ENDNOTES
1

Mike claimed the title has a pun in it, using the word “fix,” but that wasn’t
the intention. The title isn’t even mine, it’s my publisher’s.
Suggested Citation: 3 The IP Law Book Review: 43 (2013)
© 2013 William Patry
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Vol. 3 No. 2 (April 2013) pp. 51-59
THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS
INNOVATION, by Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman. Oxford
University Press, 2012. 280 pp. Hardback $27.95
Reviewed by David Fagundes, Southwestern Law School.
dfagundes@swlaw.edu
In THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS
INNOVATION, Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman recount a series of
engaging case studies from popular culture and leverage them to generate
insights that challenge the foundational assumptions of the U.S. intellectual
property system. The evidence in THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY comes in
the form of stories about fashion and football, finance and fonts. Raustiala
and Sprigman make two simple observations about each of these areas: they
are all subject to no (or very low) IP protection, and they are all
characterized by thriving innovation.
These case studies, the authors observe, illustrate that copying is clearly not
inimical to innovation, and that in many respects copying actually spurs
more and better creative production.
If this conclusion sounds
counterintuitive, that is because it strikes at the conceptual heart of
America’s IP system, which has long assumed that inventors and authors
will develop new inventions and works only if they enjoy strong legal
protection against unauthorized copying. Raustiala and Sprigman’s critique
of this premise represents a major contribution to a growing body of work
indicating that traditional assumptions about creative production require
fundamental rethinking in the age of the internet and digital media.
Before delving into its case studies, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY begins
with a succinct introduction that outlines the book’s findings and
summarizes its conclusions (p.3). THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY operates
against the background of the “monopoly theory” of innovation. This is the
familiar story of IP in American law that innovation will arise and persist
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only if creators are given exclusive rights to stamp out unauthorized uses of
their works. Yet many industries, such as fashion, appear not only to be
surviving despite the presence of rampant copying, but to be thriving to a
large extent because of rampant copying. Other industries follow this
pattern: food, football, and stand up comedy are, like fashion, subject to low
(or no) IP protection. Yet they, too, are characterized by robust degrees of
creative production. Raustiala and Sprigman are careful to stress the nuance
of their claim. They concede that laws preventing copying have an essential
role to play in our economic and cultural life. But the notion that copying
can spur as well as suppress innovation makes that role much more
conflicted than the monopoly theory suggests.
Raustiala and Sprigman’s first case study, “Knockoffs and Fashion
Victims,” adapts their previous work available elsewhere (p.19). 1 Even as
fashion has gone from an exclusive province of the social elite to a popular
obsession, it has remained a stranger to copyright protection. This has long
permitted legal copying of the most popular designers’ clothes, and the
fashion industry has long attempted to counter this through pushing legal
reforms and private anti-copying sanctions—so far, without success.
The fashion establishment’s nearly century-old battle suggests that copying
is devastating their industry. And indeed, copying is rampant, including by
prominent designers. But copying appears to be sustaining, not killing, the
fashion industry, thanks to a phenomenon Raustiala and Sprigman term the
“piracy paradox.” The paradox depends on the fact that people don’t really
need to buy new clothes as often as they do for functional reasons, so
fashion must convince them to buy new clothes to remain consistent with
the latest styles. This is the fashion cycle, and the faster trends rise and fall,
the more consumer demand there will be for new clothes. And rules
permitting copying fuel faster fashion cycles by accelerating the rate that
fashion diffuses from haute couture to Canal Street knockoffs. Raustiala
and Sprigman assemble data confirming that even as fashion piracy has
exploded in the last decade, prices for women’s dresses have remained
constant and even, in the case of the top 10% of the market, risen
substantially. (This does not, though, answer the concern raised by other
scholars that piracy does hurt middle- and lower-tier fashion designers. 2 )
The piracy paradox depends also on the tendency of fashion trends to
anchor around a handful of styles every year. Again, it’s copying that helps
drive this phenomenon. How do we know who the “winners” in a given
fashion season are? It’s the styles that get ripped off the most, since all
those knockoffs reflect the scale of popular demand for the original. And
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the beneficial effects of copying also derive from the gap between the
release of new fashions and the moment when consumers figure out which
styles have “won” that cycle. For while runway fashion can be copied
instantly (and sometimes even before it’s released, thanks to pre-fashion
week leaks), creating and distributing popular knockoffs requires some lag
time while hit styles heat up. This lag time allows creators of new fashions
a brief window of effective (if not legal) exclusivity before the winning
styles become ubiquitous and it’s time to come up with something new for
the next season.
In Chapter 2, “Cuisine, Copying, and Creativity” (p.57), Raustiala and
Sprigman turn to copying in the world of cuisine. Like fashion, food has
transformed over the last hundred years from a humdrum necessity to a
national cultural obsession. This obsession operates at the high end, with
fancy restaurants packing in customers and cooking reality shows raking in
viewers, to the low end, with food trucks garnering long lines of patrons all
over major cities. And also as with fashion, this explosion of enthusiasm
for cuisine has happened in the absence of meaningful IP protection for
most aspects of the commercial food industry. Recipes, for example, are
uncopyrightable, though advertising slogans may be protected through
trademark and distinctive restaurant décor through trade dress.
In light (though not necessarily because) of this relative lack of IP
protection, copying is rampant in the culinary world. This copying operates
at both the level of technique (such as the sous vide craze of several years
back) and specific dishes (the once-haute, now-ubiquitous molten chocolate
cake, now available at Arby’s). Yet as with fashion, food is characterized
by thriving innovation despite widespread copying.
Raustiala and
Sprigman proffer several reasons to explain this apparent paradox. First,
chefs tolerate copying but require one another to adhere to a wellunderstood set of social norms. Inspiration and homage are acceptable, but
only if due attribution is paid to the source. If a chef fails to follow the
norms of the food world, her peers may exclude her from that world.
Second, even outright copying of recipes may fail to truly supplant the
original. A diner’s experience of a dish is affected not only by ingredients
and cooking times, but also by the chef’s skilled execution of a recipe as
well as the atmosphere of the restaurant. Finally, even a perfectly copied
dish may not garner the same popularity as the original, since many diners
seek food prepared by the particular chef who originated it. You may be
able to get pork buns at many places, but there is only one place to get pork
buns made famous by David Chang—at one of his New York Momofuku
restaurants.
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The authors conclude their case study on copying and cuisine by signaling
two general themes that pervade the rest of the book. First, the cuisine
world operates pursuant to an open-source ethic. So long as chefs follow
the relevant social norms, they are willing to share their innovations with
one another, and they encourage rather than discourage copying. This ethic
may be starkly opposed to the monopoly theory of innovation, but the
richness of innovation in the cuisine world suggests that open-source may
be a superior way to achieve creative production. Second, the actual food
that ends up on your plate reflects only a fraction of what you are getting
when you go to a fancy restaurant. You’re really getting an experience—
attentive service, flossy décor, the company of other fine diners, and
proximity to a celebrity chef. In this respect, modern cuisine is as much a
performance as a product. And since performances, in cuisine or other
fields, must be seen in person to be truly experienced, they are virtually
impossible to copy.
From food, Raustiala and Sprigman turn to the world of stand-up comedy.
This chapter, “Comedy Vigilantes” (p.97), also adapts work that appears
elsewhere. 3 Comedy has transformed itself over the second half of the
twentieth century. Where comedians used to just recite snappy, generic
one-liners, their sets now consist of individualized, and often deeply
personal, comic monologues.
Yet comedy too is almost entirely
unprotected by IP, since the idea of a joke (as opposed to the particular
expression of it) enjoys no copyright protection.
In comedy, too, there is substantial creativity despite the lack of IP
protection. Unlike in fashion and food, however, the reason is not that the
comedy world is characterized by frequent copying that spurs more
innovation. Rather, comedians have developed and enforce social norms
that preclude copying. These norms sweep more broadly than copyright
law. Any comic who initially comes up with a premise for a joke, owns it.
And this includes the idea of the joke, not just the particular expression of it.
Because comedians do not rely on law to protect their jokes, though, they
have to enforce their informal rules themselves. And they do. When a
dispute over joke stealing begins, the custom is to start by simply discussing
the concern and asking the purported copier to stop. When that fails,
though, aggrieved comedians may pressure peers and venues to refuse to
deal with the copier. Robin Williams, for example, found himself
ostracized from popular Los Angeles comedy venue The Comedy Store
because of allegations of joke stealing. Comedians may also enforce norms
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by attacking the reputation of the copier. Louis C.K.’s repeated complaints
that Dane Cook stole his jokes hurt Cook’s credibility in the comedy world
so much that Cook appeared on Louis C.K.’s television show to (quasifictionally) address the issue. Or aggrieved comedians may just attack the
copier, as Joe Rogan famously did when he instigated an on-stage
confrontation with Carlos Mencia at The Comedy Store.
The authors conclude this chapter by asking why comedy innovation thrives
due to social norms preventing copying, while creativity in fashion and food
because of the ubiquity of copying. First, the comedy world is small and
close-knit enough that social norms can be both widely understood and
enforced by shaming and shunning sanctions. Second, comedians feel
compelled to create social norms rather than using IP law because the
subject matter they seek to protect—the idea of jokes—lies on the
unprotected side of copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy. Finally, strong
norm-based protection of jokes matches the detailed, highly personal nature
of current comedy routines. When comedy was just about repeating generic
one-liners, copying was rampant. But now that comedians invest much
more time in their routines, and where those routines are so much more
personal, the community has stronger incentives to protect the exclusivity of
jokes.
Raustiala and Sprigman’s final case study, “Football, Fonts, Finance, and
Feist” (p.123), examines four different areas in which innovation thrives in
the presence of frequent copying. Start with football. The sport is regularly
transformed by major innovations like the West Coast offense, the zone
blitz, or the spread offense. That these innovations persist despite a culture
that freely permits other coaches to copy them is explicable largely by firstmover advantage. A coach who comes up with a great new innovation gets
to enjoy the competitive edge it brings while other coaches struggle to catch
up and use it themselves (often “tweaking” it to make marginal
improvements that further develop its efficacy). And the innovating coach
garners fame and career advancement as a result of being recognized as the
creator of a revolutionary strategy.
Consider, by contrast, fonts. IP law, for formal and practical reasons, does
not protect typefaces. Yet the number of available fonts has exploded in
recent years, approaching 170,000 by some estimates, most of which are
substantially based on preexisting fonts. Here, technology solves the
paradox of massive innovation in the face of widespread copying. Making
typefaces has become much easier in the age of digital technology, with
much of the innovation coming from amateur rather than professional
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designers. Moreover, as printing technology changes at an accelerating
pace, so does demand for font innovation, regardless of whether those fonts
enjoy IP protection. Moreover, companies like Adobe want to be able to
boast that their software comes with attractive bells and whistles—such as a
profusion of typefaces. And since typefaces are typically ancillary to other
products, they may bring more value when widely sharable and freely
available than when held under proprietary lockdown.
The world of finance, too, is highly innovative—perhaps too much so,
considering that the Great Recession of 2008 was brought on to a large
extent by novel investment vehicles. And while courts have held business
methods to be patentable, most financial firms do not seek patents for their
innovations. The reason appears to be that firms just don’t need IP, since
those that develop major innovations typically retain a dominant market
share for years regardless of how much they are copied. This powerful
first-mover advantage may derive from the reputation and in-house
expertise associated with firms that create financial innovations. Or it may
simply be due to the fact that most firms that develop groundbreaking
investment strategies are large, well-established entities with substantial
market power and entrenched client lists.
Finally, the authors turn to the database industry. Since the Supreme
Court’s 1991 decision in Feist v. Rural Publications, 4 databases have
received only very thin copyright protection in the United States. Their
selection and arrangement of facts may be protectable, but the facts
themselves are free to be copied. This contrasts sharply with the European
Union, which (right around the time Feist was decided in the U.S.) passed a
law granting a fifteen-year period of exclusive rights to databases. The
monopoly theory of innovation would predict that this would have meant an
explosion in database productivity in Europe and a concomitant
diminishment stateside. But in what may be the most surprising reported
finding of THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY, just the opposite turned out to
be true. European database production had flatlined or slightly declined in
the decade-plus following the copy-preclusive EU law, while database
production in the U.S. had swelled to a 70% share of the global marketplace.
The reasons for this paradox are several, but most instructive among them is
that the freedom of database copying in the U.S. has led rival producers to
compete not in terms of gathering data, but in terms of thinking of new and
creative ways to present that data. Some individual European firms are
better off thanks to EU database law, but the overall European database
industry has grown weaker.
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Raustiala and Sprigman’s “Conclusion: Copies and Creativity” (p.167) is
actually the book’s penultimate chapter. The authors first summarize the
major themes that emerged from their case studies of creative industries
with no (or low) IP. These include the dynamics spawned by trends and
fads; the constraining influence of social norms; the ability to render
copying less relevant by translating products into performance; the power of
open-source methods to lower the costs of innovation; the market
dominance that first-mover advantage brings even in the absence of IP
protection; and the capacity of copies to serve as advertisements for brands.
These factors complicate the simplistic premise of the monopoly theory of
innovation that copying always crushes creative production. But what does
this mean for the future of innovation? The authors rightly stress that what
matters for making this prediction is not merely restrictions on copying, but
the return on innovation. Two factors warrant optimism that future returns
will be positive.
One is optimism bias.
Creators systematically
overestimate the success their products will achieve, as studies have
repeatedly shown. And the advent of digital media has caused the costs of
creation to drop precipitously in many fields. The combination of creators’
overconfidence with ease of production suggests a future rich in creative
production for many fields, even in the absence of strong IP rights.
The authors conclude their tour through innovation in low-IP creative
industries with “Epilogue: The Future of Music” (p.213), which considers
the book’s implications for creative industries that are subject to full IP
rights. This chapter begins with the important distinction between the
music industry (typically referring to just the major record labels) and music
itself. The popular notion that the music industry is dying is not far wrong
(record company revenues declined almost 50% from 1999-2009), but
music itself is thriving in terms of diversity and quality, availability and
quantity. The music industry’s decline may have been a self-inflicted
wound due as much to pride as to illegal filesharing. The record labels’
insistence on crushing rather than partnering with Napster only opened the
door for Apple’s iTunes to grab a stranglehold on the online music-purchase
market.
How can other creative industries, such as Hollywood, avoid the fate of the
record labels? There are glimmers of hope even from within the wreckage
of the music industry. Music, like food, can be repackaged as an experience
good, and going to a live performance is something that can’t be copied.
Bands now often earn more from touring than from record sales. Music has
also succeeded when it has been linked with social networking, which
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allows artists to rocket from obscurity to commercial success by building
fan bases via Twitter and Facebook and distributing their albums directly
via their websites. And diversification of media (vinyl, for example, retains
intrinsic appeal even in the age of MP3s) and markets (streaming options
like Spotify) may allow enough choice to keep consumers coming back.
THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY’s readable style and fun subject matter
make it suitable for a general audience, as well as well-versed IP experts. It
is at once a modest and ambitious project. Its modesty lies in the
constrained nature of its thesis. Raustiala and Sprigman do not argue that
copying is an unalloyed good, or that all IP should be abolished. Rather,
they claim merely that copying is not necessarily harmful to creative
production and can even—contrary to what the monopoly theory of
innovation suggests—spur innovation. That creativity and copying may
coexist does not, of course, tell us whether low-IP worlds such as fashion,
food, or fonts are achieving the optimal level of creative production. Chefs
and clothes designers may do better in a world of strong IP rights. But
Raustiala and Sprigman make a compelling predictive case that this is not,
at least in the industries they have studied, at all likely. And this
counterfactual uncertainty does not diminish the ambition of their thesis,
which undermines the core presumption of the monopoly theory of
innovation that copying is inimical to creative production.
Of the many promising directions for future work embedded within THE
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY, one puzzle in particular stands out: if the
authors are right that copying can be a boon to both owners and their works,
why do so many creators react angrily to unauthorized use? Are they
merely unaware of copying’s upside, or does their resistance signal an
instinctive aversion to unauthorized use that complicates this story even
further? It is a measure of the richness of Raustiala and Sprigman’s work
that this is only one of countless intriguing questions raised by this
provocative and eminently readable book.
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It is perhaps characteristic of the internet generation that it does not ask
what it cannot do; if it asks at all, it asks what it can do. This behavior
translates into an increased interest in the scope of the public domain – all
the results of intellectual activity that are free for anyone to use without a
license or permission. The internet has increased the public’s interest in the
public domain because the internet has made so many of us not only
frequent users but also regular creators of publicly accessible works that
often build on the creations of others. But the internet has certainly not
been the only impetus for the increased interest in the public domain; the
emphasis on the knowledge economy and the fact that many developed
countries rely on the creations resulting from their intellectual capital as the
major, or at least one of the major, outputs of their economies leads these
countries to focus on the protection of intellectual property and the
enforcement of intellectual property rights. The more that these countries
concentrate on protection and enforcement, the more acutely the public is
interested in defending the scope of the public domain.
Alexander Peukert, a professor of civil and commercial law who specializes
in international intellectual property law at Goethe University in Frankfurt
am Main, Germany, has responded to the general interest in the public
domain and devoted his latest book to the goal of defining its limits. As
opposed to the situation in the United States, where the contours of the
public domain have been discussed and where, as Professor Peukert has
observed, the discussion has become somewhat of a fashion wave (p.18), in
Germany the problem of delineating the public domain has not received
much attention (p.16). In addition to filling the gap in the German
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intellectual property literature, Professor Peukert works to alleviate the
global lack of contextual discussion about the future shape of the public
domain because, as he says, if one continues to look at particular legal
issues and the future of the public domain from outside of the context of
particular issues, the discussion “remains sterile and without consequences”
(p.18).
The title of the book might surprise some German-speaking readers;
although “Gemeingut” is the term that is typically used to translate the
English term “public domain,” 1 Peukert chose the title “Die
Gemeinfreiheit” for his book. The term “Gemeinfreiheit” is becoming more
frequent than “Gemeingut” in current German legal practice, including in
the decisions of German courts. 2 Peukert guides the reader through a useful
review of the etymology of the two terms and the history of the
terminological competition between them (pp. 8-18), and explains his
preference for the term “Gemeinfreiheit.” While “Gemeingut” refers to the
classification of a public domain work, “Gemeinfreiheit” emphasizes the
relationship between the user and the public domain work—the user’s
ability to freely enjoy that public domain work.
Defining the public domain is not a simple task; commentators typically use
a negative definition that describes the public domain as everything that is
not protected by intellectual property (see Figure 1). 3 Peukert points out
that international intellectual property law supports this prevailing practice
of delineating the public domain with a negative definition because
international law provides for minimum standards for protection of
intellectual property rights and for exceptions to the rights, thereby ignoring
the fact that being in the public domain should result from the default rule
and that protecting a work with intellectual property rights should be
understood as an exception to the default rule (pp.75-76).
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One difficulty with the common negative definition of the public domain
that Peukert does not discuss is that it only depicts rights with their positive
“footprint”―rights that right owners can transfer, license, etc. The negative
definition ignores the fact that intellectual property rights produce a larger
footprint for a work than simply that which is contained in the copyrighted
work itself or in the text of a patent. In infringement actions, doctrines such
as the doctrine of equivalents in patent law or the substantial similarity
doctrine in copyright law enlarge, de facto, the scope of the protected right
beyond the letter of the patent or the image or sound of the copyrighted
work. Therefore, a negative definition of the public domain would be better
expressed as shown in Figure 2, where the footprint of the intellectual
property is enlarged by the effect of the doctrines and the edges of
intellectual property are blurry—thus reflecting the impact of the doctrines,
which neither result in consistent decisions, nor offer a particularly high
degree of predictability.
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Peukert strives to present a positive definition of the public domain; his
approach aligns his work with other authors who have suggested that the
public domain should be viewed from the perspective of the rights of users
who seek to utilize the intellectual creations of others. 4 Peukert’s analysis
leads him to identify four dimensions of the public domain: a “structural
dimension,” a “time-determined dimension,” a “consensual dimension,” and
a “specific dimension.” The structural dimension (pp.19 ff.) consists of
intellectual goods that have never been subject to intellectual property, such
as basic knowledge and small improvements. The time-determined
dimension (pp.28 ff.) covers works that were once protected as intellectual
property but whose term of protection has expired. The consensual
dimension (pp.30 ff.) includes works that are protected as intellectual
property, but the owner of the property decided to forfeit, or not to enforce
the right. While this dimension is somewhat more clearly defined in the
case of registered works (where a decision to forfeit the right might
translate into a non-registration), the contours of the domain are more blurry
in cases of non-registered rights, such as copyright, where replacements for
registration, such as the system of Creative Commons licenses, strive to
bring more certainty to the dimension. Finally, the specific dimension of
the public domain (pp.32 ff.) is defined as a set of legally defined
exceptions that allow the use of the works by a specific user in a specific
manner.
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Through his analysis of the four dimensions of the public domain Peukert
offers a much richer picture of the contours of the public domain than does
the negative definition. Peukert’s model is illustrated in Figure 3.

While Peukert’s definition as illustrated in Figure 3 provides a much more
accurate picture of the public domain (the white area) than the commonlyused negative definition depicted in Figure 1, to capture the full complexity
of the picture of the public domain, Peukert’s definition should be
completed with the blurry edges of intellectual property―the extended
scope of intellectual property rights protection pictured with blurry edges in
Figure 2.
In practice, the complex public domain can maintain its shape only if it is
properly safeguarded. Peukert reviews the various means of safeguarding
the public domain and emphasizes the “careful attention to the limits of
exclusive rights” (p.129) that courts need to pay to protect the public
domain from unlawful extensions of intellectual property rights.
Procedurally, the public domain is protected through the registration
obligations imposed on some types of intellectual property; additionally,
proceedings for a declaration of invalidity can help to correct registrations
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that should not have been granted (pp.130 ff.). Attacks on validity in
infringement proceedings can also help to clarify the contours of the public
domain. Substantive law should protect the public domain from unlawful
claims of exclusive rights and permit a right owner to forfeit his rights if he
so chooses (pp.201 ff.). In a non-contractual context the public domain
needs to be protected when unlawful cease and desist letters are used to
claim nonexistent rights, or when technological protection measures are
used to protect works beyond the boundaries of intellectual property rights.
Peukert not only describes the history and current state of the public
domain, he also looks to the future and offers several proposals for changes
in German and EU law. For example, after reviewing the proposal for the
EU patent litigation system, he suggests that Germany consider abandoning
its bifurcated system—in which different bodies decide on patent
infringements and validity—and adopt a model similar to the proposed EU
patent litigation system by creating a special federal court to adjudicate
patent infringements and validity issues in one forum (p.168). Peukert’s
most intriguing proposal is for the creation of the positions of public
domain protection officers—at both the EU and national levels.
Peukert proposes that a public domain protection officer be established to
solve the enforcement deficit that he perceives in the current environment
(p.276). He emphasizes that actions for enforcement of the public domain
should not rely solely on the actions of individuals, who will act only when
they have “significant commercial or other interests,” or actions by
consumer protection organizations and business organizations (p.275). The
public domain officer would be an independent governmental officer whose
position would be similar to the position of data protection officers in the
EU and in the EU member states. 5 In Germany, establishing the position
would be easier because of the previously existing function that is fulfilled
by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of
Information, who is in charge of assisting with requests based on the
freedom of official information act (p.277), as well as matters related to data
protection.
Peukert outlines an agenda for the public domain officer, summarizes the
budgetary requirements for running the office, and explains that the
resources allocated for the position would pay off in increased freedom of
movement of knowledge and innovation (p.279). His proposed agenda does
not include any activities addressing potential future individual acts of
limiting the public domain, which differs from the agenda of the data
protection officers in the European Union, where the officers have been
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responsible for the examination of data processing prior to the
commencement of the processing―a responsibility that has been an
important component of the officers’ agenda and a role that has helped
define the EU’s approach to personal data collection and processing. 6
However, it is not surprising that Peukert does not include such prospective
activities in the public domain officer’s agenda because it is difficult to
imagine that a similar prospectively-directed agenda concerning individual
acts could exist to safeguard the public domain. As for the budgetary
considerations, they would have to be accompanied by a full impact
assessment that would need to clarify what greater level of freedom would
be achieved if the independent officer were to take actions to supplement
private actions by individuals with “significant commercial or other
interests”; the question would be whether safeguarding the public domain
outside of the “significant commercial or other interests” of individuals
would warrant the expenditure of state funds.
Although Peukert’s proposals are directed at German and EU law, Peukert
also offers a valuable comparative perspective on the public domain that
reaches beyond EU borders. The comparative perspective is an important
feature of the analysis; even though Peukert’s positive definition describes
the four dimensions of the public domain generally as they exist in every
country, the particular contours of the public domain vary logically country
by country (p.18). In addition to sharing his extensive expertise in German
and EU law, Peukert draws on his thorough knowledge of U.S. and other
non-European literature and case law to explain the perception of the public
domain in the works of numerous commentators, analyze differences in
national contours of the public domain, and discuss various means of
enforcement of the public domain. A reader unfamiliar with German law
will learn about the German system from the book. A reader with limited
knowledge of German intellectual property law will expand his knowledge
and appreciate, for example, Peukert’s detailed discussion of Germany’s
bifurcated proceedings in patent matters (in which issues of validity and
infringement are decided not by a single institution or court but by separate
institutions and courts) (p.166 ff.), and Peukert’s explanation of the monist
system in copyright law, which does not allow a copyright owner to transfer
or forfeit his copyright, thus creating a particular difficulty in the
consensual dimension of the public domain (pp.205-211).
Peukert refers to current developments in intellectual property law, such as
the extension in the European Union of the term of protection from 50 to 70
years for rights of performers and producers of phonograms, which EU
member states must implement by November 1, 2013, 7 and the proposal for
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an EU patent and an EU patent litigation system (p.167). With an up-todate picture of the trajectory of intellectual property protection and the
public domain, Peukert offers an important snapshot of a moment in the
global history of intellectual property law and development of the public
domain. In addition to being a current review, the book is timeless because
of its conceptual approach to the problem of defining the public domain.
Professor Peukert introduces a system for thinking about the public domain
and promotes an understanding of its functions and the importance of
various means to safeguard the public domain. While Peukert offers a
positive rather than negative definition of the public domain, he maintains
its reference to intellectual property and does not attempt to encompass the
larger area of “commons” (pp.46 ff.). 8 Peukert’s definition does not align
with Professor Samuelson’s notion of the continuum of various legal states
(which starts with intellectual property rights on one end and finishes with
the “constitutional public domain” on the other end), 9 but rather emphasizes
the multidimensional character of the public domain, which does not lend
itself to a linear gradation from the most to the least restrictive legal states.
Some of Peukert’s proposals might be controversial, such as creating the
position of public domain officer; however, his proposals are useful impeti,
in any case, for considering positive steps that could be taken to create a
counterbalance to the actions of supporters of stronger protection for
intellectual property.
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